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I. INTRODUCTION
Dina Sorichetti, a six-year-old infant, and her mother,
Josephine Sorichetti, sued the City of New York to recover dam-
ages for injuries inflicted on Dina by her father, Frank Sorichetti,
and for the mother's loss of services.1 Their theory under state law
was negligent failure of the police to provide reasonable protection
to Dina.
The Sorichettis married in 1949, and their third child, Dina,
was born in 1969.' The couple's marriage was stormy, with Frank
assaulting his wife on numerous occassions3 The police officers at
the 43rd Precinct knew well of Frank's violent nature.4 .
Josephine, at various intervals, sought assistance from the
1. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1985).
2. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
3. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 693. In January 1975, Frank attacked
and punched Josephine in the chest so forcefully that he sent her "flying across the room."
In July, Frank attacked her with a butcher knife, cutting her hand, and also threatened to
kill both her and the children. In September, in a fit of rage, he destroyed all the contents of
their apartment, cutting up clothes belonging to Josephine and Dina, throwing food out of
the refrigerator, and bending every knife and fork. Id.
4. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 73, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 594. In June, 1975, a police officer had
an altercation with Frank over a babysitting incident. After the attack on Josephine in July,
the police arrested Frank. Again after the September incident, the police responded to a call
for assistance, but this time they refused to arrest Frank. On October 9, 1975, the police
arrested Frank for driving while intoxicated. All these incidents involved police officers from
the 43rd Precinct. Id.
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Family Court. On November 6, 1975, the Family Court made final
a third order of protection issued in her favor against her hus-
band.5 Despite her strenuous objections, the Family Court judge
granted visitation rights to Frank to see Dina on weekends.' He
was to pick her up and leave her off at the 43rd Precinct.7 On Sat-
urday, November 8, Frank picked up Dina and on walking away
with the infant issued death threats to both her and Josephine.
Josephine immediately reported these threats to the desk officer at
the precinct; she again reported the threats when she returned to
the precinct on Sunday. But despite the issuance of the protective
order, her numerous pleas to have him arrested, and the extensive
police knowledge of Frank's violent history, the police refused to
take any action and sent Josephine home.'
Frank's sister subsequently found him passed out on the floor,
with Dina, seriously injured, lying next to him. Her father had at-
tacked her with a fork, a knife, and a screwdriver, and had also
attempted to saw off her leg.10 The attack on Dina occurred ap-
proximately one hour after the time he was to have returned her to
5. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593. In January 1975, Josephine ob-
tained her first order of protection from the Family Court. In July, the trial court issued a
second order of protection in her favor, and on November 6, the Family Court finalized a
third order of protection to last for one year. Id.
6. Sorichetti v. City of New York. 95 Misc. 2d 451, 452-53, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (Sup.
CL 1978). After the parties left court on November 6. Frank attempted to assault his wife,
and yet the judge would not rescind his visitation rights when notified of this incident.
7. Sorichetti, 95 Misc. 2d at 463, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (Sup. CL 1978).
& Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at - 482 N.E.2d at 73, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 594. Frank
threatened to kill his wife and told her that she would be making "the sign of the cross"
before the weekend was over, he told Dine that she had better make the "sign of the cross"
too. To Josephine, this statement meant he intended to kill Dina as well. Id.
9. 1d at - 482 NY-2d at 73, 492 N.Y.S2d at 594. On Saturday morning, immedi-
ately after Frank had threatened Josephine and Dine, Josephine reported the incident to
the desk officer, showed him her protective order, and requested that the police arrest
Frank. The police officer responded that because he had not "hurt her bodily" there was
nothin the police could do. On Sunday afternoon, she again pleaded with the desk officer to
arrest him. She showed him the protective order, repeated the threats Frank had made the
previous morning, and told him of Frank's past violent history. The officer, in response, told
Josephine that if Frank did not return Dine in a reasonable time, the police would send out
a radio call. A second officer, who reported for work in the late afternoon and recognized
Josephine from previous incidents in which he responded to a call for protection from
Frank, also told the desk officer that Frank was a "violent man" and suggested that he send
out a car to pick up Din. The desk officer rejected the suggestion and, at approximately
7:00 p.m., sent Josephine home. Id.
10. Id. at - 482 N.E.2d at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 595. Dina was rushed to the hospital
where she underwent approximately seven hours of surgery. She was in a coma for several
days and remained hospitalized for 40 days. She sustained brain damage from loss of blood
and is left permanently scarred and disabled. The police arrested Frank after the incident,
and he has since been convicted and sentenced for attempted murder. Id.
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the precinct.1
The supreme court denied the City's pretrial motion to dis-
miss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action."' The ap-
pellate division affirmed.1 3 A jury then returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiffs, finding that the police department had breached
the duty it owed to Dina to provide her with reasonable protection;
the jury awarded Dina $3,000,000 in damages and her mother
$40,000.14 The appellate division subsequently reduced the jury
award to $2,000,000 by remittitur."
On interlocutory appeal, 16 the New York Court of Appeals
held, unanimously affirmed: (1) a special relationship existed be-
tween the police and Josephine and her six-year-old daughter so
that the jury could properly consider whether the police fulfilled
their duty to provide reasonable protection to Dina; and (2) the
trial court's charge to the jury was proper in that it instructed the
jury not to base the special duty on the order of protection in iso-
lation, but rather, in combination with the police's knowledge of
Frank Sorichetti's violent nature and the police response to the al-
leged violation of the protective order. Sorichetti v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
II. WHAT LED TO Sorichetti?
A. Sovereign Immunity: Its History and Its Future
Sovereign immunity originated from the doctrine that the
"King can do no wrong," found in the English common law of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.17 This ancient and revered
doctrine resulted in the well established rule that the state and its
municipalities are not liable for the negligent acts of their employ-
11. Id. at _ 482 N.E.2d at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 595. The court that granted Frank
visitation privileges required him to return Dina to the precinct by 6:00 p.m. on Sunday.
The attack on Dina occurred at approximately 6:55 p.m. Id.
12. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
13. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 70 A.D.2d 573, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (App. Div. 1979).
14. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593. Josephine's
damages were for loss of services. Id.
15. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 709, 476 N.Y.S.2d 257 (App. Div. 1984)
(modifying judgment of supreme court, ordering new trial on the damages issue, unless Dina
stipulated to a reduction in her award to $2,000,000, to which she agreed).
16. The court of appeals granted the defendant's motion for leave to appeal from the
judgment. This brought up for review the nonfinal appellate division order. Sorichetti, 65
N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
17. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YAz L.J. 1, 2 (1924) (explaining his-
tory of this notion).
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ees in providing police services."' The essence of the rule is the
notion that "because we [the police] owe a duty to everybody, we
owe it to nobody."'"
Although sovereign immunity no longer precludes many gov-
ernmental bodies from liability, police immunity has essentially re-
mained intact.' The underlying policy justification for the contin-
ued existence of the rule is: (1) the fear that a complete abolition
would result in financial disaster from expanded police liability; 1
(2) the fear that after every criminal act the victim would file suit
against the city alleging police negligence and the result would be a
"flood of litigation";"2 (3) judicial reluctance to interfere with dis-
cretionary public administration decisions;"3 and (4) the notion
that "an unfortunate few" should bear the loss rather than have
18. See Comment, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HAnv. L
Rav. 821, 823 (1981) (noting that some jurisdictions have passed legislation expressly immu-
nizing municipalities for failing to provide adequate police protection). See generally, E9
McQUn.LIN, Tim LAw OP MumciAL ConlPoAr oNs § 53.27 (3d rev. ed. 1984) (citing cases)
(discussing the various municipal immunity doctrines that exist in different jurisdictions);
Municipal Police Liability, 28 A.TL.A L Rs,. 298 (1985) (police have evaded liability for
over 126 years); Comment, Municipal Liability for Failure to Provide Police Protection, 28
FoRDwHm L Rev. 316 (1959) (explaining that although the legislature has expressly waived
sovereign immunity, the courts have generally still held that there is no liability for wrongs
committed in a governmental capacity); Note, A Governmental Duty to Protect the Citi-
zen-The Schuster Case, 33 ST. JOHN'S L REv. 289 (1959) (stating that the courts have
traditionally treated the functions of the police and fire departments as governmental, so
that immunity has been available to them).
19. Rise v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). The police have typically evaded liability by argu-
ing: "We admit we are under a public duty to use professional care to prevent crime, but
our duty is owed to the general public and not to the specific individual, no matter how
identifiable: since we owe it to everybody, we owe it to nobody." Municipal Police Liability,
supra note 18.
20. Comment, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 H~Av. L
Rav. 821, 823 n.12 (1981). While many states have waived immunity, the extent to which
they have waived municipal immunity is far less evident. Particularly, the courts have vigor-
ously protected the immunity of police officers throughout the years and for various reasons.
For an excellent discussion of how this municipal body has maintained its immunity, and
why it fears a general waiver, see id.
For a persuasive argument as to why municipal immunity is an anachronism not sup-
ported by any public policy considerations, see Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453
Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
21. Rise v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897, 901 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). See infra note 25.
22. Id. at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J., dissenting). See
infra note 28.
23. Id. at 588, 240 N.E.2d at 864, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (Keating, J., dissenting). The
majority expressed as decisive the evidence of this reluctance to interfere. Id. at 581-82, 240
N.E.2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
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the public pay the costs.2 4
Each of these arguments is, however, vulnerable to criticism.
The fear of a financial disaster is arguably a myth,2" with insurance
now available and the distinct possibilty that enhanced police effi-
ciency could ultimately reduce the net societal cost of crime."
Judge Keating, in a strong dissent in Riss v. City of New York,2 7
also stated that the second argument fails because judicial bodies
must act reasonably in applying general principles of tort law. 8
The third argument is questionable when one considers the experi-
ence courts have already accumulated in reviewing police practices,
and that a court would base its finding of negligence on police reg-
ulations and policies rather than on independent expertise.2 ' Fi-
nally, the principle of "loss-spreading" refutes the fourth argu-
ment, as the Supreme Court of the United States explained in
24. Comment, supra note 20, at 834.
25. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 585, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Keating stated that the prophecy of financial disaster is a myth. The same argu-
ment was made after the State of New York waived its defense of "sovereign immunity,"
and the prophecy proved to be false then. No supposed astronomical financial burden does
or would exist. No municipality has gone bankrupt by being held liable for the tortious acts
of its employees, and New York has been paying out less than $8,000,000 in tort claims each
year. This amount comprises less than two-tenths of 1% in a budget of more than six billion
dollars. Id.
26. Comment, supra note 20, at 833. The government would have to set aside addi-
tional funds for increased insurance premiums if the courts expanded police liability. But
such expansion of liability could ultimately reduce the net societal cost of crime if police
efficiency were improved through cost internalization. But cf. Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979) (A statute authorizing a city to purchase insurance to protect its
policemen from suits arising out of their official duties did not indicate a waiver of
immunity.).
27. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
28. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 586, 240 N.E.2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Keating states that such an argument implies that the courts could not handle
the increased litigation. He proposes that this argument is fallacious. He further notes that
the plaintiff still has the burden of proving the other elements of a negligence action in
order to recover, and he states that these elements also operate to keep liability within
reasonable bounds. Id. See also Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New
Tort, 37 MIcH. L. Rav. 874 (1939). "It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that
deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation'; and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will
give the courts too much work to do." Id. at 877, reprinted in Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 595, 305 A.2d 877, 882 (1973).
29. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 588-89, 240 N.E.2d at 864-65, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04 (Keating,
J., dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 20, at 832 n.53 (Courts already have experi-
ence reviewing police action, such as tort claims for false arrest, § 1983 claims of police
misconduct, and charges of fourth amendment violations.). But see Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HAsv L. Rav. 209, 237 (1963) (Courts are
not in a position to determine whether complex governmental decisions are 'reasonable.').
19851
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Owen v. City of Independence.0 The Court said that because the
public receives the benefit of government, the public should bear
the loss caused by the negligence of governmental employees.31
The unfortunate individuals upon whom the injuries fall should
not bear alone the societal cost of police mistakes ; the governmen-
tal defendants who generally possess superior loss-bearing capacity
should bear the societal cost.32
Apart from any utilitarian concerns, Judge Keating believes
the "simple fairness" argument compels the courts to hold police
liable for negligent failure to prevent crime. Fundamental justice
demands that as between an innocent victim and negligent police
officer, the one who acted unreasonably should be liable. 3
B. Municipal Liability: The Need for a Special Relationship
The concept of immunity has received extensive criticism, and
because of evidentiary support for such criticism, there is a grow-
ing trend on the part of state courts and legislatures to abolish the
rule of governmental immunity in tort actions.34 Chief Justice
30. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
31. Id. at 657. "[Nbo longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the
principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of
official misconduct." Id. See also Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41, 48
(1949) (citation omitted) (There is widespread acceptance of the philosophy that those who
enjoy the fruits of the enterprise must also accept its risks and attendant responsibilities.).
32. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,
305 A.2d 877 (1973) (Damages resulting from the wrongful acts of government must be dis-
tributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it justly belongs.).
33. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 589, 240 N.E.2d at 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). See also Ayala, 453 Pa. at 595, 305 A.2d at 881-82 (The best statement of the rule is
that the wrongdoer is responsible for the natural and proximate consequences of his
misconduct.).
34. As part of a scathing attack on the doctrine of municipal immunity, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania quoted Dean Prosaer in the Ayala decision:
Virtually all writers have agreed that no one reason for denying liability is
sound, and all of them can be found to have been rejected at one time or another
in the decided cases. The current of criticism has been that it is better that the
losses due to tortious conduct should fall upon the municipality rather than the
injured individual, and that the torts of public employees are properly to be
regarded, as in other cases of vicarious liability, as a cost of the administration of
government, which should be distributed by taxes to the public.
Ayala, 453 Pa. at 595, 305 A.2d at 885 (quoting Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mica L. Rav. 874, 1004-05 (1939)).
For general criticism of the doctrine of immunity, see Antieau, The Tort Liability of
American Municipalities, 40 Ky. LJ. 131 (1952); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort: VII, 28 COLUtL L. Rav. 577 (1928); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
LJ. 1 (1924); David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California, 6 S. CAL L REV. 269 (1933);
Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARv. L. REV 437 (1941); Green,
[Vol. 40:333
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Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, in Muskopf v. Corn-
ing Hospital District, labelled sovereign immunity an "anachro-
nism, without rational basis, [that] has existed only by force of
inertia."5
The State of New York statutorily abolished the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in 1929, when the legislature adopted the
Court of Claims Act and established a Court of Claims to hear all
claims against the state." Not until 1945, however, in Bernadine v.
City of New York, 3 7 did the court determine that the City's immu-
nity was an extension of the State's immunity, and therefore, also
abrogated by the Court of Claims Act." Fearing possible financial
disaster for the cities and a flood of litigation, the courts preserved
the concept of immunity as applied to police departments, but
under the guise of the "public duty" doctrine.3 9 Consequently, the
government's claim that it owes the duty to provide police protec-
tion to the public at large, and not to any specific individual, has
Freedom of Litigation (III), Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1944);
Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MIcH. L. Rzv. 41, 48 (1949).
35. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961).
36. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act pro-
vides, in part:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby as-
sumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals
or corporations ....
Id.
See also Note, Municipal Corporations-Liability or Tort-Prospective Judicial Abro-
gation of the Sovereign Immunity Concept, 60 MICH. L. Rim. 379, 383 (1962). The article
indicates how subsequent judicial interpretation and legislative enactments have refined this
statutory provision over the past 30 years. The lesson to be learned from New York is that
such joint refinement is a necessity if the waiver of immunity is to reach fruition.
37. 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1949).
38. Id. The court brought to an end the exemption from liability heretofore enjoyed by
the subdivisions of the state. Justice Loughran explained that the state's waiver of sovereign
immunity in § 8 of the Court of Claims Act extended to the municipalities. Id. at 365-66, 62
N.E.2d at 605-06.
39. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 591, 240 N.E.2d 860, 866, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 906 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). Judge Keating noted that although the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity supposedly died with the broad language of § 8
of the Court of Claims Act of 1939, courts have kept it alive under the guise of "public
duty." He reasoned that to say that there is no duty is to start with the conclusion, and
that, having undertaken to provide professional police and fire protection, municipalities
should not be able to escape liability for damages caused by their failure to do even a mini-
mally adequate job of it. He stated that a better approach to the issue of municipal tort
liability is to allow the ordinary principles of tort law to limit liability rather than to perpet-
uate the fiction that there is no duty running to the general public. Id. at 585, 591-93, 240
N.E.2d at 862, 866-67, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901, 906-07 (Keating, J., dissenting).
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created an impenetrable defense to any claim against the city for
the negligent acts of its police officers, absent a "special relation-
ship."'40 In New York, as in all other jurisdictions, if no special re-
lationship exists between the city and the individual, then there
can be no redress for a police officer's negligent act of failure to
prevent a crime.'1
Although Judge Keating sees the New York courts moving to-
ward the day when they will hold the government to the same
standards of care as those of a private employer, that day has not
yet arrived.'2 Therefore, the court of appeals in Sorichetti v. City
of New York' S was still faced with the question: did a special rela-
tionship exist between the City and Dina Sorichetti, the infant, so
as to circumvent the "public duty" immunity rule, and if so, on
what basis did such a relationship exist?
C. Intrafamily Violence: A National Problem
Domestic violence is acknowledged nationwide as a major so-
cial problem of unmanageable proportions." In an effort to ad-
40. Although the legislatures and courts have taken various steps to preserve police
immunity from tort actions, it is universally accepted by all jurisdictions that if a "special
relationship" exists between the police and an individual, then a special duty exists requir-
ing the police to provide reasonable protection to the individual. The existence of such a
relationship creates an exception to general police immunity and gives a valid cause of ac-
tion to the individual. See, e.g., De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717,
469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983) (special duty existed after woman called 911 and was told that
police assistance was forthcoming); Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763,
404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978) (voluntary assumption of duty to supervise school crossings created
a special relationship); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (special duty to protect persons who have collaborated with the police
in the arrest or prosecution of criminals); Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269
N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1966) (existence of protective order created special relationship).
41. See, e.g., O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460
N.Y.S.2d 485 (1983) (holding municipality not liable for failure of its inspector to discover a
leak in a gas system because there was no special relationship between the municipality and
the injured parties); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d
897 (1968) (holding city not liable for failure to provide police protection upon request,
despite knowledge of possible imminent danger).
42. Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 590, 240 N.E.2d at 866, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Keating, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Keating believes that the New York courts are moving toward the day when
courts will hold the government, in carrying out its various functions, equally responsible for
the negligent acts of its employees as would be a private employer. Id. See also Note, Mu-
nicipal Corporations- Governmental Immunity-Tort Liability-Negligence, 22 DUQ. L
REV. 299 (1983) (detailing how the state of New York is moving toward possible abrogation
of governmental immunity).
43. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983).
44. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 11 (1984) (hereinafter
cited as FBI REPORT]. See Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967
(Vol. 40:333
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dress the problem, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have, over the past decade, enacted new legislation dealing with
domestic violence.'0 In 1962, the New York legislature adopted the
Family Court Act,"' intending "to provide practical help" to abus-
ers rather than punish them by means of criminal prosecution. 47
By the mid-1970's, however, it became obvious the New York legis-
lature's response was grossly inadequate.'8 Men still viciously at-
tack and beat their wives or lovers, and the government simply
does not provide these women with protection."
Although reform took many different forms in New York,"0 a
key development was the legislature's amendment of the Family
Court Act in 1977.51 The legislature realized and acknowledged
Wis. L. REv. 914, 916 n.6 (Statistics support the statement that family altercations are prob-
ably the single greatest cause of homicides.); see also Note, Jurisdiction Over Family Of-
fenses in New York: A Reconsideration of the Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 601 (1980) (stating that 278 spouse murders occurred in New York in 1976 and 1978
and that a serious assault, resulting in visible injury, will occur in at least 144,000 marriages
in New York each year).
45. See infra note 102.
46. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney 1963).
47. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr art. 8 commentary (McKinney 1983). There was a general con-
census in 1962, when the Family Court Act was drafted, that treatment-not prosecu-
tion-was the best societal response to family violence. Id.
48. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr art. 8 commentary at 127 (McKinney 1983). Regardless of the
good intentions to deal with the problem of domestic violence from a sociological stand-
point, the fact was that existing procedures were not protecting women. Women were still
being beaten, and some were even killed. See also Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393
N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (because of lack of police cooperation making court
processing delays critical, the protective orders were rendered largely ineffective); Woods,
Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WoMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 7 (1978) (detailing
various litigation attempts by victims of domestic violence to bring about change because of
their disillusionment with both the police and courts). But cf. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168
commentary (McKinney 1983) (indicating that police awareness that the court process is
sometimes abused by angry spouses, in part, results in a reluctance to enforce orders of
protection).
49. As is evidenced by the continued existence of domestic violence, the daily reports
thereof, and incidents such as those present in Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d
461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985), and in Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393
N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). See also FBI REPoRT, supra note 44 (statistics show
continued existence of spousal assaults).
50. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT art. 8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983). Not only did there
occur an abrupt end to the process of decriminalization, but the legislature provided for the
establishment of a large number of shelters to house victims (both women and children) of
domestic violence. Id.
51. 1977 N.Y. Laws 449 (McKinney) (The most important consequence of these amend-
ments was the radical changes in the way the legislature viewed criminal prosecution.). See
generally Note, Jurisdiction Over Family Offenses in New York: A Reconsideration of the
Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 601 (1980) (general discussion of
changes in the New York Family Court Act).
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that counseling and reconciliation are remedial tools to be used in
a secure environment, but only after meeting the primary goals of
protecting family members and putting an end to domestic
violence.8 '
The amendments not only gave victims their choice of fo-
rums,53 but also strengthened the Family Court's power to issue
"protective orders.' 4  Through this "remedial and preventive"
tool,5" the New York courts saw the opportunity to guide police
conduct in domestic violence situations and to confront head-on
the problem of spousal abuse.
The Family Court issues a protective order after its determi-
nation that the holder warrants protection from a specific individ-
ual; the order requires the individual against whom it is issued to
either do or refrain from doing certain acts.s" More significantly, a
certificate' 7 setting forth the terms of the order, when presented to
a peace officer, authorizes the officer to "take into custody" a per-
son "charged" with violating the order.'8 But does the certificate
mean anything to the peace officer? Historical evidence indicates it
52. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT art. 8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983) (emphasizing
that the legislature's first priority is to protect family members by ending the violence).
53. See supra note 51. The legislature deleted the provision giving exclusive original
jurisdiction to the Family Court, and amended the statute to provide victims with a choice
between the Family Court and criminal courts, which now have concurrent jurisdiction.
54. See N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT art. 8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983). The legislature
generally strengthened the Family Court's power to issue and enforce protective orders. The
protective order was a judicial tool for the court to use (with police assistance) to "stop the
violence, end the family disruption and provide protection." N.Y. FAIL CT. ACT § 812(2)(b)
(McKinney 1983).
55. N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr art. 8 commentary (McKinney 1983). The legislature viewed the
protective order as an indication to the abuser that the courts have deemed it necessary to
provide the holder of the order with the needed protection. By creating such an impression
on the abuser, the courts hoped that the protective order would prevent further assaults. Id.
56. N.Y. FAa. CT. AT § 446 (McKinney 1983). This section details what language a
protective order may contain and what it may require a person to do. It should be noted
that for the protective order to have effect, the person against whom it was issued had to
receive notice of the order. By receiving notice, he became aware of what he could and could
not do.
57. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 168 (McKinney 1983). Throughout this note, reference is made
to the "protective order" for the sake of clarity. The protective order entered by the court,
however, is reflected in a certificate issued to the person entitled to protection. It is, there-
fore, the certificate that actually provides notice that the court has entered a protective
order.
58. Id. It is this authority to arrest the abuser for violating the order that commenta-
tors view as the most significant aspect of the order. But cf. infra note 111 (indicating that





Many courts and commentators have criticized police response
to requests for protection from holders of protective orders and to
general calls for assistance from victims of "domestic violence."' *
The supreme court, in People v. Daniel T.," spoke of the "benign
attitude of various police departments in refusing to make arrests
in the face of actual ongoing assaults by abusing spouses . . . giv-
ing abus[ive] spouses a practical license to continue assaults
. . "62 Whether or not a protective order exists, the police fre-
quently fail to respond to calls for protection because. of their re-
luctance to intervene in domestic disputes occurring within the
home of the alleged offender. Even with the specific authority
given them by the Family Court Act, police still view family dis-
putes as having only minor importance." And when one considers
59. See infra note 63.
60. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The
allegations contained the following examples of comments the police made to the victims
when responding to a domestic disturbance call: "There is nothing wrong with a husband
hitting his wife if he does not use a weapon"; and, "Maybe if I beat my wife, she'd act right
too." Id. at 1050, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
The problem of inadequate police response is not confined to New York. For an in-
depth discussion of general police response to domestic violence situations, see R DOBASH &
R. DOsASH, VIOLaNcE AGAINST Wnvs: A CASE AGAINST THE PAmIARcWv 23-24 (1979) (One
thesis of this book is that wife abuse is perpetrated by inadequate response by institutions
from which abused women seek help.); Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A
Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14 SE'oN HALL L. REv. 74 (1983) (stressing police pref-
erence for a non arrest/mediational policy of responding to domestic violence calls); Parnes,
supra note 44 (stating that police view domestic violence as a relatively minor con-
flict-generally, not more than disorderly conduct); Woods, supra note 48 (suggesting police
officers, as a matter of policy and practice, deny battered women the rights secured them by
law); Note, Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A Survey and Sugges-
tions for Reform, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 261 (suggesting the primary reason for inadequate
police response is the high rate of police injury when responding to domestic violence
situations).
61. 95 Misc. 2d 639, 408 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978).
62. Id. at 639, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
63. Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 590, 393 N.E.2d 976, 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905
(1979). The inadequacies stem from both an attitude problem and apprehension for the
officers' safety. Police officers generally believe that domestic disputes are personal matters
best resolved within the confines of the home. Contrary to all of the statistical findings
available to them, police still tend to view family disputes as having only minor importance.
See, e.g., FBI RPORT, supra note 44.
For an excellent review of typical police response methods, see Parnes, supra note 44;
see also Note, supra note 60, at 267-68 (Police tend to believe that victims should seek the
aid of a social agency if they need outside assistance.). But cf. FtmtAL. BuREAu Or INvESTr-
CATION. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 305, 310 (1981). According to the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, 32 , of assaults on police and 19 out of a total of 91 officers' deaths in 1980 oc-
curred while responding to domestic disturbance calls. Although there is extensive evidence
of inadequate police response, these statistics do, in fairness to the police, indicate a valid
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that forty percent of all night calls involve domestic disputes, it is
easy to understand why lack of police cooperation renders protec-
tive orders largely ineffective. e'
Consequently, the New York courts were faced with the reality
that their judicial protective order could not be effective as a tool
to eliminate wife beating without police cooperation." The case of
Bruno v. Codd" emphasized this problem of inadequate police co-
operation. In Bruno, twelve battered women brought an action
against, among other defendants, the New York City Police De-
partment charging the police with refusal to assist battered women
or to arrest their assailant husbands solely because the parties
were married. 7 The evidence and statistics presented to the court
indicated unacceptable police response to domestic violence situa-
tions.as Before trial, however, the plaintiffs and police department
settled all claims between them and entered into a consent judg-
ment.6' The decree, in part, requires that the police now respond
as soon as possible to every request for assistance or protection in
family matters, based on an allegation by a person that a violation
of a protective order issued in his or her favor has occurred.70
fear-not excuse--of becoming involved in domestic confrontations.
64. Bruno, 47 N.Y.2d at 590, 393 N.E.2d at 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
65. See Note, supra note 60, at 261 n.3 (indicating wife abuse is far more serious than
husband abuse).
66. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed'
in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d
976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
67. Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1048, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (Sup. CL 1977).
68. Bruno, 47 N.Y.2d at 590, 393 N.E.2d at 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 905. A primary con-
cern voiced in the plaintiff's complaint was frequent failure of the police department to
respond to requests for safeguarding made by or on behalf of a battered or threatened wife.
69. Id. at 590, 393 N.E.2d at 980, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 905. Before the appellate court
handed down its decision, the plaintiffs and police negotiated a settlement of the dispute
between them and agreed to a consent judgment.
70. The consent decree, although not guaranteeing improved police response, does at-
tempt to insure that the situation will improve. It provides in part:
2) The Police Department and its employees have a duty to and shall re-
spond to every request for assistance or protection from or on behalf of a woman
based on an allegation that a violation or crime, or a violation of an Order of
Protection or Temporary Order of Protection, has been committed against her
by a person alleged to be her husband, whether the request be in person or by
telephone to '911' or to a precinct, by sending one or more police officers as soon
as possible to the scene.
4) Where there is reasonable cause to believe that a husband has committed
a felony against his wife and/or has violated an Order of Protection or Tempo-
rary Order of Protection, the officer shall not attempt to reconcile the parties or
mediate and the officer shall arrest the husband.
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Adoption of the consent decree by the City does, at least, indi-
cate a recognition and acknowledgment of its obligation and duty
to respond to domestic violence and to assist the courts in giving
effect to protective orders. Further evidence of this attitude is New
York City Police Commissioner McGuire's directive requiring that
the police honor orders of protection."
While it appears, therefore, that the courts and police depart-
ment have attempted to set in motion the fundamental machinery
needed to combat domestic violence, the consent decree is still no
guarantee that changes in actual police response will occur.73
Thus, the court of appeals in Sorichetti was in a position to indi-
cate to the police the consequences of failing to follow these new
guidelines and to stress the importance of combatting domestic
violence.
6) In any instance where a wife or someone on her behalf charges, within the
meaning of Family Court Act Section 168, that a husband has violated an Order
of Protection or Temporary Order of Protection, it is the responsibility of a po-
lice officer to, and the officer shall, arrest the husband provided that the officer
finds that reasonable cause exists for the officer to believe that the conduct
charged is within the scope of such Order, and that the husband has committed
the alleged act.
13) The Police Department shall amend or rescind, as necessary, all Police
Department regulations, memoranda, training materials, guides and other Police
Department documents which in any way refer to its policies, practices, and pro-
cedures so as to conform them in all respects to all provisions of this consent
decree.
15) The Defendant Police Commissioner and his successors in office shall
take all steps necessary to fully apprise all employees of the New York City
Police Department of the terms and obligations of the consent decree.
Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219, 229 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
71. N.Y. City, N.Y., Police Department Operations Order No. 78 (Aug. 25, 1978). The
order states that the police officers must respond to every request for protection accompa-
nied by a protective order. Where probable cause exists that a spouse has violated a protec-
tive order, the police must arrest the spouse committing the violation. An officer shall not
attempt to reconcile the parties or to mediate the situation. Id.
72. The consent decree does not specify the consequences of failing to respond in the
manner prescribed by the decree, but only suggests that the police must respond in a partic-
ula-r manner. It is up to the courts to indicate what the consequences for violating the terms
of the decree are, unless the police department adopts such consequences as part of their
manual. See generally Woods, supra note 48 (detailing how to prepare for litigating a suit
involving domestic violence, and how to attempt to thereby bring about changes in the re-
sponse of police departments to these situations).
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III. Sorichetti: AN ANALYSIS
The court of appeals in Sorichetti7 3 was faced with a unique
set of facts presenting issues which required skilled legal reasoning
in applying the "special duty" rule to find the City liable.' The
law is well settled that absent a special duty owed to a specific
individual, or class of individuals, a police department cannot be
liable for the negligent actions of its employees. 75 For the court to
hold the City liable, the doctrine of stare decisis required the court
to find that a special relationship existed between the City and the
plaintiff, Dina Sorichetti.'
Accordingly, the court had to address the question of how it
could find that a special relationship existed considering the
following-
(1) The protective order granted to Josephine did not mention
Dina within its scope."
(2) The court of appeals had recently decided Riss v. City of
New York, 7  holding that prior knowledge of imminent danger did
not create a special duty.79
(3) Was the fact that the mother reasonably relied on the as-
surance of police action sufficient to create a duty owed Dina, the
victim?"e
73. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1985).
74. The facts may be unique because: (1) the court issued the protective order in
Josephine's name only and did not mention Dina as warranting protection; (2) in fact, the
Family Court judge gave Frank, the father, weekend visitation rights, arguably indicating
that Dina was in no danger; (3) reasonable reliance has traditionally served to protect the
interests of the person relying on the assurance, in this case Josephine, and not Dina.
75. See supr note 41.
76. See supro note 41. Precedent required that a special relationship needed to exist
between the plaintiff and the police department for the city to have a special duty to pro-
vide reasonable protection to the plaintiff. The court in Sorichetti stressed the need for
direct contact between the police and the infant before it could impose a special duty.
Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
77. Josephine was the only person mentioned in the order of protection, and therefore,
arguably, the only one entitled to protection. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at
72, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
78. Rise v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
79. Id. For an analysis of how the court overcame this problem, see infra note 94.
80. In the instant case, Dina, although an infant, did not receive any assurance and
therefore could not have relied on the assurance given to her mother, Josephine. The De
Long v. County of Erie decision supports the finding of a special duty owed to the person
who relies on police assurances. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
The question remains, therefore, how the court can interpret reasonable reliance by the
mother to create a duty owed to Dina.
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A. A Need To Deal with the Domestic Violence Issue
Intrafamily violence is of great societal concern, e1 and because
Dina's injuries were the direct result of domestic violence, the
court needed to address primarily the issue of the significance of a
protective order as a means of eliminating this type of violence.82
The court, therefore, had the opportunity to emphasize to the po-
lice the required response when presented with a protective order,
the scope of the order, and the consequences of failing to respond
in the required manner.
The appellate division had ruled in Baker v. City of New
York,8 3 that a judicial protective order, by its very existence, noti-
fies peace officers that the court has determined that the individual
has a special need for protection, thereby creating a special duty
owed by the police to provide reasonable protection to the individ-
ual.68 The duty owed, however, is limited to the specific individual
or individuals named in the order.16
The Baker decision supports a finding in Sorichetti that a spe-
cial duty was owed Josephine, as holder of the order." The lower
court's decision in Sorichetti, however, appears inconsistent be-
cause it cites Baker to support its holding that the court can hold
the police liable to a third party for breach of a duty owed to the
holder of a protective order. The court in Baker, by its express
language, rejects this expanded reading of the decision, stating
81. See supra note 44.
82. Creation of the "protective order" was an instrument whereby the courts could at-
tempt to deal with the problem of domestic violence. Due to the inadequacies of police
response to calls for assistance, the court in Sorichetti v. City of New York needed to ex-
press the importance of the protective order. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1985). See supra note 60.
83. 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1966).
84. Id. In Baker, a husband shot his wife while in the waiting room of the Domestic
Relations Court. She held a protective order issued in her favor against her husband. About
a month prior to the incident the police responded to a call from the woman, but when
presented with the protective order they had refused to take further action, saying that is
was "only a piece of paper" and "no good." Some weeks later the woman saw her husband
in the Domestic Relations Court at a scheduled meeting; on seeing him, she expressed her
fear of being exposed to him and requested permission to remain in the office where she was
located. The court personnel denied her request and sent her to the waiting room where
some 20 minutes later her husband shot her. The court held that the existence of the pro-
tective order was sufficient to create a special relationship, and therefore, the police owed a
special duty of protection to the woman. Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269
N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1966).
85. Id. at 772, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
86. Id. Applying Baker, Josephine was the person "singled out" as owed a special duty
of protection, because the court issued the protective order in her favor.
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that "[p]laintiff was. . . singled out by judicial process as a person
in need of special protection and peace officers had a duty to pro-
vide protection to her.''s
The court of appeals in Sorichetti acknowledged the trial
court's instruction to the jury that, due to the presence of a protec-
tive order, the City owed Josephine a special duty of protection
which extended to Dina." The court of appeals held, however, that
while a special relationship existed between the City and
Josephine based on the protective order, the protective order alone
was not sufficient to find a special relationship between the City
and Dina.
The court did seize the opportunity to clearly define the re-
quired police response when presented with a protective order, in-
terpreting Family Court Act section 16890 to be consistent with
traditional tort law and acknowledging judicial concern for com-
batting domestic violence. The court said:
In enacting Family Court Act § 168, the Legislature intended to
encourage police involvement in domestic matters, an area in
which the police traditionally have exhibited a reluctance to in-
tervene. The statute does not evince a legislative determination
that the scope of municipal tort liability attendant upon tradi-
tional governmental activities, such as police protection, should
be extended to an entire class. By its terms, section 168 provides
that a certificate of protection "shall constitute authority" for a
peace officer to take into custody one who reasonably appears to
have violated the order.. . . When presented with an order of
protection, a police officer is not mandated to make an arrest.
Nonetheless, such presentation along with an allegation that the
order has been violated, obligates the officer to investigate and
take appropriate action. ... The order evinces a preincident
legislative and judicial determination that its holder should be
accorded a reasonable degree of protection from a particular in-
dividual. It is presumptive evidence that the individual whose
conduct is proscribed has already been found by a court to be a
dangerous or violent person and that violations of the order's
terms should be treated seriously."9
87. Id. at 772, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (emphasis added). See supra note 86.
88. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at - 482 N.E.2d at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 46.
91. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75-76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97.
(Vol. 40:333
POLICE TORT LIABILITY
B. The Finding of a Special Relationship
Unable to justify the existence of a special relationship based
on the protective order alone, the court turned to the issue of
whether the police's extensive knowledge of Frank Sorichetti's vio-
lent history was sufficient to establish a special relationship. To
answer the question affirmatively, the court needed to distinguish
Riss v. City of New York,"9 which held that prior knowledge of
imminent danger did not give rise to a special duty owed the po-
tential victim."
The court of appeals distinguished Riss on its facts." In so
doing, the court also cited the police's response to Josephine's plea
for them to arrest Frank as a critical fact in finding that a special
duty existed between the City and Dina.e5 In Sorichetti, the police
told Josephine that if Frank did not return the child within a rea-
sonable time, then they would dispatch a car to investigate." The
court held reliance on such a statement was reasonable, citing De
Long v. County of Erie" as support for this finding. In De Long,
there existed a special relationship where a woman called 911 and
was told assistance would be forthcoming; she relied on the assur-
ance and exposed herself to a danger which resulted in her death."
92. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
93. Id. In Riss, the court of appeals held that the police were not liable for the injuries
suffered by a woman, despite their knowledge of numerous threats against her and her re-
peated pleas for protection. Her ex-suitor, an attorney, made constant death threats against
the woman and made plans to have her beaten. The woman was aware of his threats and
plans. Despite notice of his threats and plans to assault her, the police denied her requests
for protection. Some time thereafter, a third party hired by her ex-suitor attacked her.
Judge Keating, in a strong dissent, pointed out that it is a crime to conspire to injure some-
one, and the police had actual knowledge of this conspiracy and other threats. Nonetheless,
the majority expressed concern over interfering in the allocation of police resources and
declined to find a special duty where the court had not given her a guarantee of protection,
and absent a violent history to support the threats. Id.
94. Id. The court in Riss noted that the suitor was unknown to the police, seemingly a
citizen in good standing who, until the incident, had voiced only "hollow threats" against
the victim. The police in Riss also never undertook to provide protection; instead they made
it clear that they would not do so. Id.
In contrast, Frank Sorichetti had a history of violent behavior, well known to the police,
who had on various occasions intervened in disturbances involving Frank. In fact, the pro-
tective order given to the police officer also indicated a judicial determination that Frank
was a violent man. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
95. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (The police's
response was listed as one of four factors that created a special relationship.).
96. Id. at -, -, 482 N.E.2d at 73, 76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 594, 597.
97. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
98. Id. In De Long, the woman who relied on the assurance of forthcoming police pro-
tection was the victim who suffered the injury. Id. In Sorichetti v. City of New York,
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The court of appeals in Sorichetti concluded that the violation
of a protective order, the police's knowledge that Frank was a vio-
lent man, and Josephine's reasonable reliance on the police's
promise to take action, together were sufficient to find a special
relationship between the City and both Josephine and Dina."
They therefore affirmed the jury's finding of police negligence. Sig-
nificantly, the court stated that the existence of the special rela-
tionship existed only through a combination of these three
factors.'"
There can be little doubt that a finding of no duty would have
led to a public outcry.101 But caution in reading the decision, which
requires a combination of factors to establish a special relation-
ship, makes it necessary to ask: of what significance is Sorichetti to
the future fight for an end to domestic violence, and of what signif-
icance is it to the police and the doctrine of police immunity?
IV. WHERE HAS Sorichetti LEFT Us AND WHERE IS IT TAKING
Us?
Throughout the country, the state legislatures have enacted a
significant amount of legislation aimed at providing some form of
protection to victims of domestic violence.102 There can be no
Josephine relied on the police's assurance, and similarly, therefore, the police owed her a
special duty of protection. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985). But this
presents the novel question of whether a mother's reasonable expectation of police assis-
tance is sufficient to create a special relationship between the police and the mother's
daughter, the eventual victim. See infra note 124.
99. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at , 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
100. The following language appeared in the WESTLAW version of the opinion, al-
though it did not appear in the official reporter. "[Tlhe jury was properly instructed that
the special duty was not to be based on the order of protection in isolation, but rather, in
combination with the police's knowledge of Frank Sorichetti's violent propensity and their
response to the claimed violation of the order in this particular factual situation." Sorichetti
v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (19865) (WESTLAW,
NY.CS database, p. 21).
101. The tragic incident and horrific injuries suffered by Dina, a six-year-old, at the
hands of her father, generated a great deal of publicity and public sympathy. An even
greater amount of publicity and criticism of the "general duty" immunity doctrine would
have resulted if the court had not held the police liable for their actions.
102. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have, within the last decade, en-
acted some legislation aimed at dealing with domestic violence situations. The following is a
list of provisions that represent recent enactments, indicating the form of protection pro-
vided, as listed in Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv. J.
ON LEGs. 61, 62 n.1 (1984):
ALA. CODE §§ 30-5-1 to -11 (Supp. 1982) (protection order); ALASKA STAT. §§
25.35.10-.060 [sic] (1983) (protection order, police intervention); ARIz. REV. STAT
ANN. §§ 13-3601 to -3602 (Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order, police interven-
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doubt that the legislatures and the courts are attempting to ad-
tion, criminal law); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1653 to -1659 (Supp. 1981) (criminal
law); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4359 (West 1983) (protection order); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§§ 545-553 (West Supp. 1983); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-4-101 to -105 (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of Apr. 29, 1983, ch. 175, 1983
Colo. Sess. Laws 640; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38 (West Supp. 1982) (pro-
tection order); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901(9), 902, 921(6), 925(15), 950(5)
(1974 & Supp. 1982) (protection order); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to -1006
(1981 & Supp. 1983) (protection order, criminal law); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30
(West Supp. 1983) (protection order); GA. CODE §§ 19-13-1 to -5 (1982 & Supp.
1983) (protection order); HAWAII Rav. STAT. § 586 (Supp. 1982), amended by
H.B. 1102, 12th Leg. (1983) (protection order); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (1947 &
Supp. 1982) (police intervention); Illinois Domestic Violence Act §§ 101-103,
201-213, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2301-1 to -3, 2302-12 to -13 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of August 18, 1983, Pub. Act
No. 83-101, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1102 (West); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-5.1 to -6
(West Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); IOWA Coos ANN. §§ 236-1 to -8 (West
Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); KAN. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 60-3101 to -
3111 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of May 6, 1983,
ch. 201, § 1, 1983 Kan. Ses. Laws 1127; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.010 to .140,
403.710 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (protection order); LA Rav. STAT. ANN. §§
46:2131-2139 (West 1982) (protection order), amended by Act of July 24, 1983,
Act No. 195 § 1, 1983 La. Seas. Law Serv. 875 (West), and Acts of July 2, 1983,
Acts No. 406, 407, 1983 La. Seas. Law Serv. 1400, 1401 (West); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 761-770 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (protection order); MD. CTs. & JUn.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-404, 4-501 to -506 (Supp. 1982) (protection order); MASS.
GEN, LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34C, ch. 209A, §§ 1-6 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (protec-
tion order); MicH. Comnp. LAws ANN. §§ 764.15(a)-(b), 769.4a, 772.13, 772.14a
(West 1982) (police intervention, criminal law); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1982)
(protection order, police intervention), amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1983, ch. 52,
§ 1, 1983 Minn. Seas. Law Serv. 205 (West); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-21-1 to -29
(Supp. 1982) (protection order); Mo. RaV. STAT. §§ 455.010-.085 (Supp. 1983)
(protection order); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(3) (1981) (protection order);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-901 to -903, -924 to -926 (1978) (protection order); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 33.020 (1979) (protection order); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 173-B:1 to
-B:11 (Supp. 1979) (protection order), amended by Act of June 29, 1983, ch. 522,
1983 N.H. Laws 777; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-1 to -16 (West 1982) (protection
order); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-7 (Supp. 1981) (police intervention); N.Y. FAbL
CT. ACT § 153-C, 155, 168, 216-a(ii), 812, 813, 817, 818, 821-828, 832-836, 838,
841-847 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1976-1982) (protection order), amended by
Act of June 21, 1983, ch. 347, 1983 N.Y. Laws 601; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1 to -7
(Supp. 1981) (protection order); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-07.1-01 to -08 (1981 &
Supp. 1983) (protection order); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1901.18-19, 1909.02
(Page Supp. 1982) (protection order); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 60-60.6 (West
Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order), amended by Act of June 23, 1983, ch. 290,
1983 Okla. Sess. Laws 888; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700-.720, 133.310, 133.381 (1977
& 1981) (police intervention), amended by S.B. 476, 62nd Leg., 1983 Regular
Sess.; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10.182-10, 190 [sic] (Purdon 1977 & Supp.
1982-1983) (protection order); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-15-1 to-7 (Supp. 1983) (pro-
tection order); S.D.CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-10-1 to -14 (Supp. 1982) (protec-
tion order); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1201 to -1215 (Supp. 1982) (protection or-
der); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.01 to .19 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (protection
order), Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 631, 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4046 (Vernon)
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dress the problem of domestic violence and that improved police
response to domestic violence situations is an unquestionable
goal.10" Some states have adopted "mandatory arrest" statutes re-
quiring police to make a warrantless arrest of the abuser if there is
probable cause to believe a spousal assault has occurred.'" Other
states have enacted legislation that authorizes a warrantless arrest
at the scene of the incident, if there is probable cause to believe a
felony or misdemeanor has been committed, or if a protective or-
der has been violated.10 5
A few statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional, and
have survived such challenges.'"6 Generally, the statutes also pro-
(amending Tzx. F u. CODE ANN. § 71.11, adding Max. FAu. CODE ANN. § 3.581,
and adding Tzx. PneAL CODE ANN. § 25.08); Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 878, 1983
TeL Ses. Law Serv. 3857 (Vernon) (amending Tx FAM. CODE §§ 71.01-.06,
71.13); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 to -6-8 (Supp. 1983) (protection order); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1101-1107 (Supp. 1981) (protection order), amended by Act
of Apr. 27, 1982, No. 218, 1982 Vt. Acts 362; J. Res. of Feb. 28, 1978, Va. Acts
1920 (police intervention); WASH. Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 10.99.010-.070 (1980 &
Supp. 1982) (police intervention); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2A-1 to -10 (1980 & Supp.
1982) (protection order); Wis. STAT. ANN. j9 767.23, 813.025(2)(a) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1982-1983) (protection order); Wvo. STAT. §§ 35-21-101 to -107 (Supp.
1982) (protection order). Extensive legislation is currently pending in South
Carolina.
Certain of the listed provisions have recently been amended. Research indicates, however,
that the amendments are directed toward stronger legislation and increased police arrest
powers.
103. See, eg., ALAsKA STAT. 9 18.65.510-.520 (1981 & Supp. 1982) (police officer must
use all means necessary to prevent further abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29(2) (West Supp.
1984) (police officer must file report of incident, whether arrest occurs or not); Ma. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 91 769-770 (1981 & Supp. 1982'1983) (police officer must stay until the
victim is no longer in danger). See infra note 115.
104. See, e.g., Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 1 770(5) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
4 (Supp. 1979); OIL Ray. STAT. §§ 133.055, 133.310 (1973 & Supp. 1979) (Although unclear,
the supreme court in Nearing v. Weaver stated that the statute mandated arrest upon a
showing of probable cause that a protective order had been violated. 670 P.2d 137 (Or.
1983)); UTAH CODE ANN. 1 30-6-8(1) (1978 & Supp. 1981). See also Lerman, supra note 102,
at § 5.03 & commentary (providing a model provision on "mandatory arrest").
105. See, e.g., ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §9 901-
15(6) to -(7) (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. FAhs
CT. AcT. if 155, 168 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980-1981). But see CAL PENAL CODE 99
273.5, 1000.6 to .11 (West Supp. 1981) (making spousal abuse a separate offense).
106. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1981) (holding the Min-
nesota Domestic Abuse Act constitutional); Missouri ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d
223 (Mo. 1982) (holding the Missouri Adult Abuse Act constitutional). Of more significant
constitutional concern is the fact that many of these statutes allow for the warrantless arrest
of the alleged abuser if there is probable cause to believe that a spousal assault has oc-
curred. Although domestic violence is of unmanageable proportions, the constitutional right
to be free from police intrusion into one's "castle" is a right Americans have defended for
years. Of utmost importance then, and a conflict worth studying, is whether the concern of
expanding the power to make warrantless arrests is outweighed by the benefit received by
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vide immunity for police officers from any criminal or civil liability
for making an arrest, provided the police officer acts in good faith
and without malice.10 7
Support for the adoption of mandatory arrest statutes by
every jurisdiction is extensive.' Model domestic violence statutes
have appeared in various legal journals1 " and correctly focused on
victim protection and required police response. And recently, the
Department of Justice appointed a task force to study the problem
of domestic violence and make recommendations. 10
Why then, amidst all this scholarly activity and extensive leg-
islation providing victims with protection mechanisms, is
Sorichetti significant and not just another judicial decision inter-
preting a family abuse prevention statute? Its significance is in the
court's finding the city liable; despite all the legislation, there still
exists the "general duty" immunity doctrine for the negligent acts
of police officers."' While all the domestic violence prevention
statutes detail the opportunities for protection afforded potential
victims, and the required response of police officers, they do not, in
the victims-particularly when spouses abuse the system. For an excellent review of the
constitutional aspects of domestic violence statutes, see Note, supra note 60, at 281-87.
107. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901-15(7)(b) (West Supp. 1984).
108. See Finesmith, supra note 60 (survey indicates that mandatory arrest and strong
legislation are most effective means of combatting domestic violence); Lerman, Expansion
of Arrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. Rv. 59 (1982) (mandatory arrest
is most effective). But ef. Bethel & Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of Domes-
tic Violence, 7 VT. L REv. 15 (1982) (proposing that mediation is the most effective way of
dealing with spousal abuse); Parnas, supra note 44 (suggesting that a jail sentence would
deplete the family finances and that the courts should refer these cases to counselors, social
workers, and psychologists). See generally Comment, Immediate Arrest in Domestic Vio-
lence Situations: Mandate or Alternative, 14 CAP. U1. REv. 243 (1985) (detailing reasons
why alternatives should also be available although mandatory arrest might achieve the best
results); Note, supra note 60 (Although mandatory arrest is statistically most effective, the
commentator did not include it in his model.).
For an excellent discussion on the study done by the Police Foundation that indicates
mandatory arrest is the best deterrent to domestic violence, see Lerman, supra note 102, at
123 n.168. Although the report indicated mandatory arrest to be most effective, the report
did not recommend it as the procedure for police to follow.
For details of a further study on domestic violence, see Finesmith, supra note 60 (out-
lining results of the Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which has been out of
print since 1982).
109. E.g., Lerman, supra note 102. This model is an outstanding in depth proposal that
offers alternatives and commentary on every provision.
110. See LawScope-Family Violence, 70 A.B.A. J. 26, 27 (Dec. 1984), commenting on
1984 ATr'y GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE FINAL REPORT (1984). The 157-page re-
port stated that the police should arrest the abuser when criminal behavior is alleged, in-
cluding instances of child abuse and spouse abuse.
11. See supra notes 39, 40 & 41.
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
similar detail, express the consequences for the police when they
fail to act in the required manner.11' Therefore, unless the statute
or a municipal ordinance explicitly states that the issuance of a
judicial order to a potential victim creates a special duty owed that
person, then the City still has the "general duty" immunity de-
fense to protect it from liability in the event a police officer negli-
gently breaches his duty to provide protection.'" And more impor-
tantly, unless the statute or a municipal ordinance imposes a duty
upon the police to respond in a reasonable manner to every domes-
tic violence situation-regardless of whether or not a judicial pro-
tective order exists-then again the "general duty" immunity rule
will prevent liability, and police response will not be improved.' 4
Absent such express statutory language or adequate police guide-
lines, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to determine the
extent of liability and thereby attempt to guarantee improved po-
lice response. 5
Sorichetti is an attempt to provide such a guarantee, and in so
doing, discloses a relaxation of the judicially constructed "general
duty" impediment to recovery for harm caused by the negligent
failure of police to prevent crime."' The court of appeals has
spelled out the required response to an alleged violation of a pro-
tective order and the consequences for failing to respond. And,
more significantly, the court appears to indicate that there are sit-
uations where--even absent a protective order--circumstances will
mandate a reasonable police response and a special duty will arise,
the breach of which will impose liability on the City." 7
The court also noted in Sorichetti that the Bruno consent de-
112. While most statutes provide a provision granting immunity from civil liability in
the event of a good faith arrest, they do not state the consequences for failing to act in the
prescribed manner. No statutes state that immunity is no defense for failing to respond to
domestic violence situations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. I 901-15(7)(b) (West Supp. 1984).
113. See supra notes 39, 40 & 41. In order to circumvent the present immunity, a spe-
cial duty must exist. To avoid any ambiguity, therefore, the stautes should state that a
protective order gives rise to a "special" duty to provide protection.
114. See supra notes 39, 40 & 41. The situation where there is no protective order is
more difficult'to address. The legislature should state, though, under what circum-
stances--absent a protective order1 -a special duty arises, if any.
115. E.g., Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). The
consent decree mandated that the police arrest the abuser if a protective order has been
violated or a felony committed. The New York statute, in contrast, only authorized arrest.
See also Woods, supra note 48 (an in depth explanation of how to litigate an action on
behalf of battered women).
116. See Municipal Police Liability, supra note 18.
117. Special circumstances, where an order is not present, might still create a special
relationship. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
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cree is an acknowledgment by the police department of its obliga-
tion to improve its response to domestic violence situations. 1 8
That the horrors of Sorichetti would not have occurred had the
consent decree been in place is a valid argument because police
response may well have prevented the attack. And such a consent
decree, with the related orders issued by Commissioner McGuire,
are exactly the type of municipal ordinances needed to unambigu-
ously detail the required police response and to explain that do-
mestic violence situations create a special duty between the police
and the victim.11'
Although Sorichetti provided answers to certain questions,
others remain which the court did not answer. Ideally, the police
department should answer these questions in the police manual on
duties and responsibilities; 20 but if not provided for, then the
Commissioner himself or the legislature must address these ques-
tions. The questions must not be left for resolution in the litigation
of a regrettable disaster.""1 Unanswered questions include:
(1) Whether a protective order, or similar judicial instrument,
issued to an individual is sufficient on its own to impose a duty on
the police to respond in a reasonable manner when the holder al-
leges that a third party is in immediate danger of being harmed by
the person against whom it is issued."2 "
118. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
119. See supra note 115. Successful litigation against police departments does provide
victims with an effective means of bringing about change in police response. See Bruno v.
Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (consent decree); see also
Doe v. Bellville, No. 81-5256 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1984) (same).
120. For an indication of the importance of these manuals, see Sorichetti, 95 Misc. 2d
at 463-64, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 227-28.
121. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1968) (Keating, J., dissenting). Justice Keating, throughout his dissenting opinion, spelled
out the need to take action prior to litigating claims involving domestic disputes which re-
sult from police negligence. He suggests that unless the police can adequately and effectively
deal with domestic violence situations, we are all walking a fine line of danger. Id.
122. The court in Sorichetti v. City of New York leaves this question unanswered to the
extent that it did not find the protective order extended to Dina. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d
70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985). In contrast, the trial court specifically stated that because the
injuries to Dina may not have occurred if the police had acted on the protective order, this
was sufficient to extend the duty owed to Dina. Sorichetti, 95 Misc. 2d at 463, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 227. The consent decree in Bruno v. Codd would also require the police to respond if the
mother simply alleges that the father has violated an order. 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976,
419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1977). See supra note 100; see also Note, supra note 60, at 276 nn. 101-02
(listing those state statutes that provide for the expansion of the scope of the protective
order to the immediate family, or even to those members living in the household who are
not immediate family). But cf. Potter v. Bennett, 40 A.D.2d 546, 334 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App.
Div. 1972) (holding order did not extend to household).
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(2) Whether police knowledge of a person's violent history is
sufficient on its own to impose a duty on the police to respond in a
reasonable manner to a plea for protection. 1 3
(3) Whether reasonable reliance by a holder of a protective or-
der that the police will provide assistance is sufficient on its own to
create a special duty."'
(4) What the appropriate police response is to a plea for pro-
tection based on threats of interspousal violence absent any violent
history.1 6
The court of appeals in Sorichetti did not, however, have to
answer these questions because it had a combination of factors
present in the fact pattern."O The court did, however, clarify the
importance of a protective order. It is no longer a "judgment call"
for the police whether or not to respond and investigate when
presented with a protective order and an allegation of its violation.
Nor is a protective order a "worthless piece of paper" requiring
injury to the holder before authorizing action; it is, in fact, a "court
given" shield to victims saying: "This will protect you.
''12
Perhaps though, Sorichetti's most significant future benefit
will be its direct impact on the "attackers" themselves. Expecting
the Family Court to be more liberal in its issuance of protective
orders, and knowing that the police are obligated to respond to
123. Police knowledge of the direct threats made against Dina, and therefore, the fore-
ebility that she might be in imminent danger appear to be sufficient to create a special
duty. See Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 A.D.2d 465, 151 N.Y.S.2d 485 (App. Div. 1956)
(special knowledge of the police was sufficient to create a cause of action); Jones v. County
of Herkimer, 51 Misc. 2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (knowledge was sufficient to
create a special duty). But see Rise v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1968) (knowledge of imminent danger does not create special duty, absent the
assurance of the police that they will provide assistance).
124. Sorichetti v. City of Now York does not answer the question. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482
N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985). The De Long v. County of Erie decision, however,
would appear to answer this question affirmatively. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469
N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983). De Long will provide the precedent for issues involving reasonable
reliance alone. Significantly, De Long expanded the scope of municipal liability by stating
that a 911 call for assistance, although available to the general public, is sufficient to create
a special relationship.
125. The Bruno v. Codd consent decree does attempt to answer the question, but does
not detail the required response absent a protective order. 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976,
419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1977).
126. See supra note 100. After Ries v. City of New York, the courts needed to tread
carefully before imposing liability on a city. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1968). The court in Sorichetti v. City of New York, therefore, used a combination of all
the factors to find the existence of a special duty. 65 N.Y.2d at - 402 N.E.2d at 75, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 596.
127. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75-76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97.
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every alleged violation and that they have the power to make a
warrantless arrest, the possibility of time in jail may well be the
best deterrent to future assaults."5 But the impact of Sorichetti in
this manner can only be measured over a period of time.
V. CONCLUSION
Although most people agree that professionals trained in the
workings of the mind and in conflicts peculiar to marriage are best
able to deal with domestic violence, there is an immediate need to
formulate an effective theory for handling domestic distur-
bances. 12 The police, the courts, and the legislature need to coop-
erate in this endeavor.
In accord with the desire to improve standards of police be-
havior when dealing with domestic violence, the court in Sorichetti
offered the protective order as a means of achieving this
goal-preventing domestic violence. It gave significant meaning
and power to the judicial protective order, requiring only produc-
tion of an order to compel police response. 13 0 Although such judi-
cial response is surely welcomed by society as a whole, maybe the
courts and legislature need to take even more dramatic steps. 1
The protective order does appear to be a potentially successful
means for the courts to deal with domestic violence, but the courts
must also ensure that the police improve their response to the or-
der. As Judge Keating in his dissent in Riss stated, the "police
must be required to live up to at least the same minimal standards
128. See Woods, supra note 48, at 31 n.154 (indicating reports of improved situations
are due to the abusers now being aware of their possible arrest).
129. The New York legislature realized that an understanding of the problem and a
need for counseling are probably the best means of permanently controlling the problem of
domestic violence. But after the violence continued, the legislature altered the statute and
indicated that until such steps achieve the desired result, it is necessary to take immediate
police and judicial action to prevent continued abuse. See supra text accompanying notes
46-55.
130. See supra text accompanying note 127.
131. There is extensive support for the argument that the legislature must adopt the
mandatory arrest provision. Statistics support the argument that it is the best deterrent
offered to date for dealing effectively with domestic violence. See supra note 108.
There is also the argument that, even if the legislature does not adopt this provision,
the courts should require it and move toward the total abrogation of the "general duty"
immunity doctrine. The court of appeals, however, expressly declined to require mandatory
arrest. Sorichetti, 65 N.Y.2d at -, 482 N.E.2d at 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
It must be noted that legislatures have passed extensive litigation to improve the situa-
tion by means of establishing "shelters" for both women and children. See Family Law in
1984: Heightened Recognition of Domestic Abuse Victims, Custodial Rights and Support
Obligations, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1027, 1029 (1985).
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of professional competency which would be demanded of a private
detective." 8'
To achieve this would, however, require the abolition of the
"general duty" immunity doctrine.18' It is with this notion in mind
that Sorichetti can best be summarized as sending the following
messages to all jurisdictions: no longer must the "general duty" im-
munity doctrine bar recovery in domestic violence situations. In
fact, these same unfortunate domestic situations-of great societal
concern-present the courts with a valuable opportunity to use
them as a means of abrogating this judicially created impediment
to police liability.1 "
GREG ANDERSON'
132. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1958) (Keating, J., dissenting).
133. Regardless of present legislation, and judicial decisions, this judicially created im-
pediment still remains. See supra note 39.
134. See Municipal Police Liability, supra note 18.
* The author would like to thank Carmen for her thoughtful insight and support, and
Tracy Tucker for her assistance in preparing this note for publication.
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